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To one interested in law and legal processes, the interplay
between secular and religious law in Israel is one of the most
complex and fascinating aspects of the modern Jewish state. In
this book, which is based on a series of articles that originally
appeared in Mishpatim, the Hebrew language law review of the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Professor Izhak Englardt explores this most difficult subject. In the first two sections Professor Englard grapples with theoretical definitional problems
concerning the nature of religious law, the general relationship
between the state and religious law, and theories concerning the
reception of religious law in a secular state system. The heart of
the book, however, is contained in the third section which examines in great depth problems of the application of religious
law in the secular courts of Israel.
Before discussing in greater detail the analysis contained in
these sections, it should be noted that the title is somewhat misleading. This book is not a comprehensive treatise on the involvement of "religious law" in the broadest sense in the Israeli
legal system. Rather, it is primarily concerned with the application of Jewish law in the regular "secular" Israeli courts.
To clarify what the book is not about, it must be remembered that the non-Islamic religious communities throughout
the Ottoman Empire were treated as "national" groups and were
given considerable legal autonomy, including the right to maintain independent court systems to regulate matters of personal
status such as marriage, divorce, custody and adoption of chil-
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dren, and inheritance. 2 Such autonomy continued throughout
the British Mandatory period and survives even now in the
Jewish state.3 As a result, there are today in Israel fourteen officially recognized religious court systems-Jewish, Moslem, Druze,
Bahai, and ten different Christian denominations-that coexist
with the regular "secular" court system. 4 Thus the term "religious law" in the book's title is overinclusive due to the book's
almost exclusive concern with Jewish law. In another sense,
however, it may be viewed as underinclusive, or at least ambiguous as to its inclusiveness. As noted above, these diverse
religious communities were viewed as national groups by the Ottoman Empire. This concept continued into the Mandatory
period. While the law governing personal status employed by a
given communal group to govern its affairs may have been based
on the religious tenets of the group, that fact was not of concern
to the Ottoman or British lawmaker. The recognition of the
autonomy of these communal groups was not an expression of
religious tolerance, as that phrase is generally used in the American context. Rather it was an expression of the recognition by
the governing power of the autonomy of different groupings of
peoples under its domain, groupings that are difficult to
categorize as exclusively religious or national, and, perhaps, are
best described simply as communal. This autonomy has continued into the Jewish state.
Added to this general national or communal aspect of religious law, as that term must be used in the context of Israel, is
the specific national character of Jewish law. This review is not
the place to discuss all the ramifications of the view that Jewish
law is the national-religious law of the Jewish people. Yet, an
understanding of the place of Jewish law in the state of Israel
must take into account the fact that the Jewish legal tradition is a
national as well as a religious one. Jewish law is not a law limited
to ritual observance or the relationship between man and his
Maker. On the contrary, it is an all-encompassing legal system
which reaches all areas of conduct normally regulated by a "secu2 I. ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS LAW IN THE ISRAEL LEGAL SYSTEM 13 (1975). It should be
noted that the translation is an excellent one. Although the book is not easy reading,
these difficulties are not a product of translation problems, but rather of the complexities of the concepts discussed.
3 Id.
' It should be noted that, except for the Druze, Bahai, and an Anglican Church,
this current list of officially recognized religious courts with power to determine issues
of personal status of members of their communities stems from British legislation in
1922. The Druze court system was added to the others by Israeli legislation in 1962; the
Evangelical Episcopal Church, in 1970; and the Bahai faith, in 1971. '
.-
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lar" legal system. This national character of Jewish law was preserved during the long absence of Jewish national sovereignty by
the existence, throughout most of this period, of autonomous
judicial authority granted to local Jewish communities in many
countries in which they resided. At the same time, however, this
national law is also religious law. Its basis in transcendent religious concepts differentiates it from the law of the modern
nation-state. Its essential constitution is Revelation. Although subject to interpretation and even modification, such interpretation
and modification is entrusted to an oligarchy of scholars, not to
the popular will. The accommodation between such a legal system and that of a modern democratic state is the phenomenon
Professor Englard addresses.
In the first section of his book, Professor Englard explores
this unique national-religious character of Jewish law in the
course of reaching his conclusion that Jewish law is indeed a
normative legal system. Despite the existence of local Jewish
communities in different parts of the world, such as Hassidic
"courts," which could be said to be organized religious societies
enforcing obedience to the commands of Jewish law, there is no
worldwide organized Jewish society which enforces the law's
commands. In Israel this has resulted in a continued attempt to
achieve community adherence to Jewish law through the mechanisms of the state.
Professor Englard discusses at length various theories concerning the ability, or lack of ability, of different normative legal
systems to coexist. The discussion draws heavily upon the
theoretical writings of European legal scholars concerned with
this issue, particularly in terms of conflict of laws, or as the
subject is known in Europe, private international law. Although
these theoretical disputations are quite complex and very foreign
to one trained in American law, Professor Englard's superb
analytic mind, as well as his good sense, serve to elucidate the
issues for even the uninformed reader. This review is not the
place to discuss at length these theoretical problems. Suffice it to
note that Professor Englard, following the views of Hans Kelsen,
accepts the position that a legal system possesses at its base a
postulate of validity for its norms which derives from the means
by which these norms are created. This validity criterion gives
the legal system unity and exclusivity in the sense that norms
that do not meet the validity test are excluded. 5 Although Pro5 For Professor Englard's discussion of the role of the validity criterion, see I.
supra note 2, at 33-46.
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fessor Englard himself does not so state, it would appear that in
a modern democratic legal system, such as that of Israel, this
validity criterion consists of the will of its duly elected lawmakers.
Under Jewish law, on the contrary, it is the received tradition,
stemming from Revelation, which includes the determination
that the authorized interpreters, or modifiers, of that tradition
are a non-elected oligarchy. Thus, the essential clash in the basic
validity criteria of the two systems.
Two different schools of thought exist as to the ways that
different legal systems may interact: one postulates that the existence of two separate valid legal systems is inconceivable since
each system must reject the norms of other systems that do not
meet its validity criterion; the other accepts the proposition that
separate systems do interact and do accept, in fact, norms of
other systems. Professor Englard notes-correctly in my opinion
-that these schools represent different facets of the same reality. Within a given system, norms of a foreign system are valid
only in so far as the first system accepts them through its validity
process. On the other hand, the reality of the existence of other
systems forces each system to endeavor to accommodate itself to
that fact, and to accept norms of other systems into its own.
Professor Englard further observes that these concepts lead not
only to the view that system B's norms cannot exist in system A
except as validly accepted in system A, but also that system A
itself can promulgate no norms that invalidate the norms of
system B within system B itself. System B may be subservient to
system A in whole or in part. Such subservience could come
about through the independent determinations of each system
that in a given situation B is subservient to A, or through a
compact between A and B, such as the American constitution, or
simply through the greater power of A to enforce its will in
conflict situations. In such cases a norm of system B may be
inoperative when it clashes with a norm of system A. Even in
such cases, however, the norm of system B remains a norm
within that system. Professor Englard proceeds to note an important psychological fact affecting this interaction in Israel:
[T]he state regards the religious courts as acting under
authority granted by it and subject to its laws. The religious judges see their role in a different light; for
them the applicability of religious law is not conditioned
upon the secular lawmaker's will. They look upon their
courts as autonomous bodies which derive their author-
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from a separate, independent normative
ity primarily
6
system .
As stated above, the heart of the book concerns the complex
legal issues involved in the application of Jewish law in the Israeli
secular courts. Professor Englard is most sensitive to the problems faced by the secular courts when they must determine the
content of Jewish law that they are statutorily compelled to
apply in a given case. Many of these problems are remarkably
similar to those faced by an American federal court judge applying state law in a diversity case.
For example, Professor Englard perceptively notes the dilemma facing a judge concerning his appropriate creative role in
applying the law of another system. He observes that
In the case of foreign law, he approaches his task as a
kind of observer from the outside who is satisfied with
finding what "exists..... [He] has no feeling of identification with the foreign normative provisions; he
lacks that sense of responsibility for the integrity of the
system and its orderly working in society as is largely
7
the case in the application of his own law.
Thus, in Professor Englard's view a judge appropriately is inclined to play a less creative role in applying the law of a system
of which he is not a part than he would be were he fashioning
the law of the system of which he is a part. A more actively
creative approach, it is feared, might lead the judge to reach
results inconsistent with those a court of the foreign system
would have reached. On the other hand, it would seem that an
unduly passive posture by a judge might have the same effect
if the law of the foreign system is a dynamic one. Professor
Englard's emphasis on the problem of undue activism rather
than undue passivism may represent his sense of the current lack
of dynamism in Jewish law, or his view that due to the insufficient sensitivity of non-religious judges to the norms of Jewish
law, undue passivism is preferable to undue activism, or both.
Professor Englard goes on to note, however, that even with
the best resolution of the problem of judicial activism, differences in outcome between courts of the two systems, both purportedly applying the same Jewish law, are inevitable. One of the
reasons given for this is that the secular courts continue to utilize
6

Id. 46.

'Id. 85-86 (footnotes omitted).
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their own "procedure" while applying the "substantive law" of
the religious court system. This phenomenon and the difficulties
it has produced are, of course, well known to students of American diversity jurisdiction. Professor Englard goes on to state that,
in addition to this and other objective factors,
the possibility of divergence is inevitable because of the
religious character of the norms. The larger the judge's
role in the judicial process, the greater the prospect of
divergence. The feature particular to Jewish law-the
absence of codification and the existence of many points
still in dispute-lend weight to the role of the religious
judge in the process of law determination. Even apart
from this factor, there is an essential difference in the
ideology of the secular judge. The difference is of particular significance where one poses it against the religious outlook in respect of a religious fiorm. The
tension is not so accentuated when the relationship between the legal systems of two states is involved, since
very possibly no substantial difference exists between
the social background of the two, systems; there are
reasonable prospects that the conclusion of the local
judge will not be very distant from that which the
foreign judge would reach in applying his own law. The
situation is otherwise with respect to religious law based
as that is on transcendent presuppositions which are not
acceptable to persons who are not of the same faith.
This difference is especially in evidence where the
religious norms themselves leave scope for judicial discretion as when a general concept involving a value
judgment is to be construed. It is, for example, a principle of Jewish religious law that the decisive test regarding custody is "the child's welfare." What will appear to be best for a child's welfare to a judge of a
religious court will almost certainly not accord with the
tests applied by a secular judge who does not regard
8
himself bound by the yoke of religious commandment.
While Professor Englard may be correct that this problem is
accentuated when one of the legal systems involved in religious,
it is not obvious that the same problem is not also severe when
that is not the case. In the American context, one is reminded of
the different results reached concerning the meaning and appli8

Id. 105-06 (footnotes omitted).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 125:1428

cation of federal constitutional principles in state and federal
courts. This is perhaps most vividly demonstrated in the numerous cases in which state criminal convictions, upheld in the state
courts over federal constitutional objections, have been overturned in federal habeas corpus proceedings. In such cases the
federal and state court judges may share similar personal and
professional backgrounds and, indeed, be neighbors. The differences in outlook may only be explainable by the different
institutional expectations of the different normative legal systems, even in systems as similar as those of the American federal
and state systems.
Moreover, the American system has been sensitive to the
problems inherent in the attempts of one legal system to apply
another system's vague criteria involving significant judicial discretion, exactly in the area discussed by Professor Englard
-domestic relations. Despite the lack of explicit statutory bases
for this determination, the federal courts have long held that
domestic relations cases are generally excluded from diversity
jurisdiction. 9 Moreover, such matters are also generally excluded
from the basic proposition of American law that causes of action
are transitory. Unlike most other types of cases in which courts
of one state will routinely entertain actions that are to be governed by the law of another state as long as the forum state has
the requisite jurisdiction over the parties, it is most unusual for
one state to apply the domestic relations law of another.1 Instead, the determination that the forum has the requisite jurisdiction over the parties to entertain the action also serves as a
determination that the forum will apply its own law. Even when
legal systems are as similar as those of the American states, it is
undoubtedly auspicious to avoid, as much as possible, situations
in which one normative legal system is asked to apply another
system's legal standard which is vague, discretionary, and ultimately determined by unwritten community standards as are
"welfare of the child" or "indignities" justifying divorce. A
fortiori, such situations should be avoided as far as possible in the
Israeli context discussed by Professor Englard.
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It is not possible in a short review to comment on all the
problems of the application of Jewish law in Israeli secular courts
discussed by Professor Englard. Note must be made, however, of
his excellent discussion of two important considerations: the
questionable desirability of applying a public policy qualification
to the reception of Jewish law by the secular Israeli courts, and
the procedure-substance dichotomy by which the secular courts
apply the substantive but not the procedural aspects of Jewish
law.
Professor Englard concludes, after extensive discussion, that
the doctrine by which the courts of one system refuse to apply a
foreign system's otherwise applicable law because the substance
of that foreign law is repugnant to the "public policy" of the
forum state, as determined by the latter's courts, should have no
application in the context of the application of Jewish law in
Israeli secular courts." If a principle of Jewish law is to be rejected as contrary to "public policy" of the Jewish state, Professor
Englard argues that this should be done by an act of the legislature replacing the Jewish law principle with another, for purposes of the state legal system, and not by its rejection by the
courts on the basis of vaguely defined criteria of public policy. A
broadly defined "public policy" exception to the application of
otherwise applicable foreign law is quite troublesome even on
the international level. Whatever its proper use there, however,
Professor Englard appears to me quite right in rejecting it in the
unique Israeli context. The comparable situation to Israel is not
that of separate nations interacting, but that of, for example, the
federal union of the United States.
Professor Englard is more sympathetic, however, to another
method of controlling the results of Jewish law by secular authorities-the invalidation of religious courts' judgments by the
Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice,' 2 on
the grounds that the religious court violated the "principles of
natural justice." This "direct review," which has its roots in English administrative law, applies only to procedural matters, not
substantive ones. It provides a means, analogous to the American constitutional doctrine of procedural due process, for ensur"See I.

ENGLARD, supra note 2, at 142-52.

12 In addition to its appellate jurisdiction over lower secular courts, the Israeli Su-

preme Court has original jurisdiction "sitting as High Court of Justice" to determine
matters in which it sees the necessity of providing relief in the interests of justice and
which are not within the jurisdiction of any other court, religious or secular. Courts
Law § 7(a), 11 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 157, 158 (1957).
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ing adherence to basic procedural safeguards. In accepting the
legitimacy of this type of review, Professor Englard relies on
the responsibility of the High Court of Justice to ensure that all
judicial organs of the state, including the rabbinic courts, adhere
to minimum standards of natural justice,1 3 or procedural due
process, if one might use that term. He points out, however, that
there is no reason to believe that such standards are not also part
of religious law. Consequently, he regards with favor a recent
trend of the Israeli Supreme Court to refuse to intervene on this
basis at an early stage in the religious court proceedings, but
rather "to direct the complainant to the appellate tribunals of the
religious system on the assumption that a violation of the 4principles of natural justice is also a violation of religious law."'
While accepting the legitimacy of "direct review" of religious
court judgments by the Israeli Supreme Court, Professor Englard questions the soundness of the view that religious court
judgments which have become final are legitimately subject to
collateral attack in the civil courts on similar grounds of violation
of the principles of natural justice.'3 These arguments, including
the question of whether a judgment rendered in violation of the
principles of natural justice is thereby beyond the court's
'jurisdiction," 16 will clearly remind one versed in American law
of the problems of collateral attack on state criminal judgments
in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
The negative act .of rejecting a normative principle of
another legal system as "offensive to public policy" should not be
confused, however, with what Professor Englard describes as
"the positive function of public policy,"117 the determination to
apply the law of the forum state in a given situation because of
an affirmative policy decision to accomplish a given result. In the
context of religious law in the Israeli legal system, the issue arises
in the application of independent state norms in areas generally
regulated by religious law. Professor Englard notes that binding
religious norms in matters of personal status exist at the sufferance of the state law-making authorities. "Secular regulation can
always in principle replace religious law, which in effect means
replacing personal law by a uniform territorial law."' 8 Professor
11
1. ENGLARD,
4

supra note 2, at 162.

1 Id. 163.
"5 See id. 163-68.
6
See id. 166-67.
17
18

See id. 152-61.
1d. 152.
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Englard explicitly declines to take any position on what he terms
"a political and ideological question of the highest order:" the
extent to which such a replacement should be effected today in
Israel. His reluctance to enter this thicket is quite understandable; nevertheless, I would hope that in some future work Professor Englard will bring to bear his wealth of knowledge, analytic acuteness, and sound judgment on this most important
question.
Professor Englard does discuss, however, the difficulties involved in several such replacements which have taken place. 9 It
must be emphasized that when Professor Englard speaks of the
replacement of religious law by secular law, he is, in light of his
theories of the independence of normative legal systems discussed above, referring only to the replacement of Jewish law
with a different norm for purposes of the state's normative system; the state's normative system itself cannot change a norm of
Jewish law within the latter's normative system. This is exemplified by the state's attempts to force the religious courts to apply
secular norms in certain situations. The ensuing difficulties have
led to a strong presumption against future attempts of a similar
nature. The legislature can instead allow religious law and the
jurisdiction of religious courts to continue unimpeded, but impose criminal sanctions for the commission of the undesired act.
Alternatively, the legislature may deny exclusive jurisdiction to
the religious courts by providing for concurrent jurisdiction in
the secular courts where the secular norms will be applied.20
Neither of these solutions is without great difficulties, however.
Thus far we have been discussing legislative action to replace religious norms with secular ones. The courts, however,
also become involved in this process. Courts must, of course,
interpret legislative enactments that refer to religious laws. Professor Englard notes, with apparent-although not explicit-disapproval, a number of instances in which the secular courts have
demonstrated their disapproval of the application of religious
law by broad interpretations of the legislature's secular replacement rules, or, conversely, by restrictive interpretations of the
legislature's provisions directing the application of religious law.
Professor Englard is critical, for example, of court holdings that
when the legislature directs the secular courts to apply religious
law to a matter, they did not intend to incorporate the "public
'"See id. 152-61.

20Id. 155.
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policy" aspects of the religious law. 2 1 Although difficulties can
arise in requiring the secular judge to apply vague standards of a
religious system in implementing religious law, 22 similar problems need not arise when clear religious law principles require
courts to refuse to enforce certain types of contracts, or to deny
certain kinds of equitable relief to those with unclean hands.
Professor Englard is correct, in my opinion, in stating that there
is no reason to believe that the legislature did not intend to
adopt such public policy concepts of religious law when it di23
rected the application of religious law.
Running through this section of the book, however, is a
deeper theme, a theme that permeates the entire work: the view
that when and if "religious" law is to be replaced by "secular" law
as the binding law of the state system, it should be accomplished
by state legislative and not by state judicial action. Such a view is
quite natural in a parliamentary system of government such as
that of Israel. Yet, that does not seem to be the complete reason
for Professor Englard's view. For indeed, Israel is also, to some
extent at least, a common law country, with a great deal of judicial lawmaking accepted as a normal and legitimate part of the
system. Rather, Professor Englard's view seems to derive from
the peculiarly sensitive political and ideological nature of problems involving religious law in general, and Jewish law in particular, in Israel. If at all possible, these problems should be
decided by explicit legislative decision. This conclusion rests on
the general theory of democratic government that sensitive policy decisions should be made by the sovereign representative
legislature and should not be delegated by the legislature to
others,2 4 as well as on the particular nature of the Israeli political
structure which insures legislative representation of the different
viewpoints involved in the ongoing societal debate as to the appropriate role of Jewish law in the country. Of course, all legislation requires interpretation. The acceptance of Professor
Englard's proposition requires that the secular courts interpret
vague legislative directions on the basis of a presumption that
the status quo in regard to the role of religious law in the Israeli
21
See
22

id. 168-77.
See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) and Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945) for examples of American federal courts applying
state "public policy" as part of state law in the context of diversity jurisdiction.
24
Cf Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student
Conduct and Status: A NonconstitutionalAnalysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373, 387-88 (1969)
(delegation of sensitive decisionmaking role should not be assumed lightly).
23
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governmental system is not to be disturbed except by explicit
legislative command. Such a presumption would put the burden
of determining these issues where it belongs, on the legislature.
The final major issue discussed by Professor Englard is the
problem created by the secular courts' use of their own procedural rules in applying religious substantive law. In this section, consistent with the major thrust of his work in support of
the autonomy of religious law, Professor Englard rejects a broad
definition of procedure based on the accepted, although highly
criticized, definition in English law for purposes of choice of law
in the international context and advocates a more restrictive
meaning of the term related to the function of the proceduralsubstantive dichotomy in the context under discussion. Without
going into the details of Professor Englard's test and its application, suffice to say he reaches results quite similar to those that
have been reached in the United States in relation to diversity
jurisdiction.
This last point emphasizes what is, perhaps, the most striking aspect of this book to one trained in American law. One
begins reading it expecting to find a very esoteric, perhaps even
exotic, discussion of problems of religion and law that are quite
foreign to the American system. One finds, however, that most
of the discussion is not only not exotic, but is, indeed, quite
familiar. The basic problems discussed in this book involve the
interaction between different normative legal systems, each having its own court system, within the boundaries of one nationstate. The parallels to the situation in the United States are most
striking. Professor Englard's analysis of these problems is therefore quite relevant to one concerned with problems of American
federalism as well as to students of Israeli society.
The one weakness of this otherwise outstanding book is also
related to its relevance to the legal problems of American
federalism. This relevance is a two-way street. The American
legal experience has much to contribute to the problems discussed in the book; the absence of any discussion of this experience is quite marked. American legal developments, I would
submit, are much more relevant to many of the issues of the
book than is the law of private international law (or conflicts)
which Professor Englard admits is of limited significance, but
with which he continuously struggles. In terms of the problems
involved in the co-existence of different normative legal systems
within the same geographic and political limits, American and
Israeli scholars, as well as courts, have much to learn from each
other.
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